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INTRODUCTION
Both traditional and asymmetric threats continue to pose 
challenges to any combatant commander in a Stability, 
Security, Transition, and Reconstruction (SSTR) Operation. 
Limited threats that were once confined to littoral and brown 
waters now extend to the green water theater. Many NATO 
countries operate frigates in green water SSTR missions, 
typically as a single unit scouting vast areas. In the calm 
waters of the Mediterranean and Gulf of Aden, small, agile, 
fast and usually cheap small craft are often encountered. 
In this study we investigate the question of whether a 
swarm of 4 - 8 small vessels, armed with hand-held weapons, 
can attack and achieve a mission kill on a typical NATO FFH 
operating in a SSTR mission. In this context our primary 
goals for IDFW18 were to examine the factors driving the 
model and create a suitable experimental design. Our 
secondary goals were to create inputs based on the selected 
design, conduct runs on the SEED Center’s cluster computer, 
and analyze the output of the model for any interesting 
results. 
Figure 1: Frigate and Attacker (SAFC) placement map
Modeling
The scenario consists of a single frigate, sometimes 
accompanied by a helicopter, operating in open waters (Fig. 
1). The frigate is attacked by four or eight small agile and 
fast craft (SAFC) of varying types and armament. The 
measure of the defenders effectiveness is whether or not the 
frigate survives this engagement. The frigate will be 
considered to have 'lost' the scenario when it is hit as many 
times as it has allocated hit points. This approach allows us 
to model the frigate as a single entity, rather than modeling 
all compartments, personnel and machinery.
Factors
Many factors affect the outcome of an encounter. Some of 
these factors, such as frigate armament and Tactics, 
Techniques, and Procedures (TTPs), are controllable by 
NATO forces. Other factors, such as the number of SAFCs or 
their weaponry, cannot be controlled by NATO forces. 
Because of this, we chose to analyze the model using robust 
design techniques. Factors are classified as controllable or 
uncontrollable. The latter are referred to as “noise factors.” 
The noise factors are varied to see how much impact they 
have, but are not used as independent variables in the 
analysis. Instead, we calculate a measure of “loss” for each 
design point in the controllable factor space. The loss 
function is based on both the expected performance and the 
variance at each point, calculated over the noise factors.
For the controllable factors, a 22 factor NOLH design 
was chosen. The total number of factors for the frigate was 47, 
so several groups of related factors were “lockstepped,” i.e., 
all elements within a group were varied in identical fashion 
based on a common scale factor. Consider the main gun of a 
frigate as an example. The lower the inter-firing time, the 
more ammo it will carry. Probably it will also be designed 
with a wide firing arc since it represents a modern weapon 
system. All three of these factors were therefore varied in 
unison.
Since the objective is to induce variability with the noise 
factors rather than directly estimate their impact, a  much 
sparser design can be used.  We chose a Hadamard matrix of 
size 20 to vary noise factors between their minimum and 
maximum values. The NOLH and Hadamard designs were 
then crossed to create a study file with 2480 design points.
Item Minimum Maximum 
Max speed 14 kt 35 kt
Main Guns 1 x 76mm 1 x 127mm, AP-Round
Auxiliary Guns None 2 x 30mm, targeting computer
Small Guns 2 x 7,62 MG 2 x 12.7 mm, computer stabilized
CIWS None 30 mm full auto gun / missiles
Heli Max Speed 120 kt 190 kt
Helicopters None 1 
#AGM-114N (if 
Helicopter) 2 8
Table1: Main blue design factors
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Tactics
All weapons exchanges were modeled using a step function 
for hit probabilities. Each weapon was assigned a minimum 
and a  maximum effective range. This has three reasons. First, 
the level of abstraction chosen dictates some abstraction on 
the hit probabilities. The second reason is to prevent the 
model from wasting ammunition on extremely low hit 
probabilities, due to MANA constraints. The third reason is 
that it is actually not possible to calculate even a remotely 
true P(hit) based on factors such as wind, target speed, size 
and facing. Instead, these are subsumed within the 
randomness, and should average out over the effective range 
of the step function.
Actual Rules of Engagement do not allow for the frigate to 
shoot at an approaching SAFC until the hostile intent of each 
individual SAFC is determined, either by firing upon the 
frigate or closing to within a reaction range despite 
warnings. Variations in the reaction range and reaction type 
will represent the use of non-lethal weapons as well as ROE 
reaction distances. The frigate must assume that all 
approaching vessels are in fact neutral. One of our research 
questions is to see if reaction distances to these threats 
actually make a difference.
As mentioned before, the Frigate, SAFC, and  Helicopter 
robustness and skills were modeled using hit points. For the 
SAFC the variation in hit points reflects not only their inherent 
survivability, but also their agility and sea-state influences.
DATA ANALYSIS
Two replications over the design space were performed. The 
loss function was calculated by collapsing each replication 
over the noise factors and calculating the mean and standard 
deviation of the frigates killed. We used a squared-error loss 
function, which is constructed by summing squared 
deviations from the ideal outcome (zero frigates killed) with 
variance.  Low loss values are achieved by consistently 
having a low expected number of successful attacks against 
the frigate.  Loss will increase if more attacks are successful 
or if the observed results are inconsistent, i.e., highly 
variable.
 
Figure 3: Sorted parameter Estimates
The first analysis was done using partition trees. Most 
important splits were on HellfireAmmo>2, AuxGun 
HitProbability, Frigate Hit points and ROE Engagement 
Distance>900yards.
The second analysis was done using a multiple regression 
analysis. All main effects, two-way interactions, and quadratic 
effects were considered for the controllable factors.  Most of 
the terms were not statistically significant, and our final 
model yielded an R2 of 0.86 with five main effects and three 
interaction terms (Fig. 3). 
CONCLUSIONS
The results using partition trees and regression analysis both 
indicate a  set of capabilities needed for successfully 
defending against small swarms. Both show that in this 
setup, the Hellfire equipped Helicopter is paramount. This 
was expected and validating, as other studies had shown 
comparable results. It is also noteworthy that the Helicopter 
is a cofactor in all interaction terms in the regression 
analysis. Both of the frigate’s organic damage sustainment 
capabilities are also important. Whether these are in the form 
of specially designed compartments, armor or damage 
control, the survivability of the frigate is an important factor. 
Of equal importance are auxiliary guns with a high 
probability to hit. Hit probability for this type of weapons is 
achieved by good weapon characteristics and either a lot of 
training, or a computer controlled weapon mount. These 
mounts are common sights on new vessels, and should be 
refitted on older ones. An ROE engagement distance of 900 
yards or more is important, as the main weapon of the 
attackers, the RPG-7, has an absolute maximum range of 940 
yards. Nonetheless it is interesting to note that after the 
small craft passed the 900 yard threshold, it does not matter 
if the frigate begins to defend at 800 or at 200 yards distance. 
This is reassuring both for the use of non-lethal weapons, 
and for typical ROEs.
An interesting observation is that there are no important 
quadratic terms in the regression model.  The observed 
outcomes are well predicted using only linear terms and their 
interactions.
Both the main gun and the CIW Systems had no 
significant role in this model. This may be explained by the 
fact that both have, in these scenarios, a  relatively long 
minimum attack distance, and both have a relatively high 
inter-target time. As MANA does not allow us to model inter-
target time explicitly, it is included in the inter-firing times. 
This results in quite a slow rate of fire for both weapon 
systems. 
The small guns modeled were also not significant. We 
infer that the other defense systems were too dominant for 
these guns to show up as a contributing factor.
Some of the lockstepped factors showed up as 
significant. Future research should therefore use a new design 
of experiments so that the lockstepped factors will  not be 
confounded. Influential factors such as hit points should be 
investigated further, to determine whether the results are 
based on design, armor or crew capability. Of highest interest 
should be the crew’s performance, as it is the only factor 
changeable for contemporary designs. Finally, a red teaming/
red tactics approach should be used to determine which 
changes may be employed by the SAFC to counteract any of 
the frigate’s new tactics and armament.
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